Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the First Amendment by Hibbert, Michelle
American Indian Law Review
Volume 23 | Number 2
1-1-1999
Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
and the First Amendment
Michelle Hibbert
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle Hibbert, Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the First
Amendment, 23 Am. Indian L. Rev. 425 (1999),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/7
COMMENT
GALILEOS OR GRAVE ROBBERS? SCIENCE, THE
NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND
REPATRIATION ACT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Michelle Hibbert*
Hailed by some as premier Native American civil rights legislation' but
lambasted by others as representing an impermissible infringement on
scientific inquiry,2 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act of 1990 directs all museums and institutions receiving federal money to
identify, inventory, and repatriate Native American skeletal remains and
cultural items to appropriate lineal descendants? Archaeologists and
anthropologists oppose this legislation on the grounds that it has the potential
to halt much of their ongoing research and foreclose future opportunity to
examine Native American skeletal remains and cultural items.4 Are these
archeologists who disinter skeletal remains like modem Galileos,5 irrationally
*Third-year student, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.S., 1995, Arizona State University.
First-place winner, 1997-98 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,173-02, S17,174-S17,175 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Inouye). Sen. Daniel Inouye (D.-Haw.) stated that the intent of Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act is to protect the "civil rights of America's first citizens." 14 at
S17,174; cf. Thomas A. Livesay, The Impact of the Federal Repatriation Act on State-Operated
Museums, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293,296 (1992). Livesay quotes Dr. David Phillips, the original chair
of the Committee on Sensitive Materials at the Museum of New Mexico. Dr. Phillips' committee
was charged with identifying the items in the museum potentially subject to repatriation. Dr.
Phillips stated: "Repatriation is an issue of civil rights for Native Americans and, by extension,
for all of us." See id.
2. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 614, 66-627 (D. Or. 1997)
(Bonnichsen 1); see also Complaint at 9, Bonnichsen (No. 96-1481-JE).
3. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994)); see also Jack F. Trope
& Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act:
Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 35, 69-72 (1992).
4. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 646-49 (D. Or. 1997)
(Bonnichsen 11); see also Peter R. Afrasiabi, Note, Property Rights in Human Skeletal Remains,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 807, 816-17 (1997).
5. See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Report: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1637, 1638 (1993). Chesebro writes that due to persecution by the Catholic Church,
Galileo was "forced to repent by the Roman Inquisition and spent the last eight years of his life
under house arrest." See id. at 1638 (citing William D. Montalbano, Vatican Finds Galileo 'Not
Guilty', Pope Admits Error in Rejecting Theory, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1992, at A40). However,
in 1992, "after a thirteen-year study of the case, a special commission of the Pontifical Academy
of Sciences" cleared Galileo of conducting "junk science." ld; see also Jack R. London,
Exponential Change: Today IsAlready Tomorrow, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 153, 153 (1992) (stating
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persecuted because of their scientific method, or are they simply "grave
robbers"?"
This comment will examine whether the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) could survive a
constitutional challenge based on the claim it impermissibly infringes on
one's right to scientific inquiry Part I of this comment discusses the
historical development of legislation which applies to Native American
cultural items and skeletal remains, and examines how these laws reflect
changing legal and social attitudes of who should properly retain custody of
those items. Part II outlines the debate between Native Americans who
oppose grave excavation and scientists claiming the right to examine ancient
Native American skeletal remains and cultural items. In particular, this
section will focus on why Native Americans are opposed to skeletal research
and why science feels that the disinterring of human remains and other burial
goods is both legitimate and necessary. Part III will analyze whether
NAGPRA could survive a challenge based upon a First Amendment right of
scientific inquiry. In particular, this section focuses on the pending
constitutional challenge to NAGPRA brought by plaintiffs in the "Kennewick
Man" case;' why legal scholars believe such a right exits; and finally,
whether NAGPRA constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on such a
right. Part IV concludes that even if courts determine that the First
Amendment encompasses the right of scientific inquiry, NAGPRA can
survive a constitutional challenge. Because NAGPRA represents at least
that it took the Catholic Church 383 years to acknowledge and apologize for wrongly persecuting
Galileo for his scientific theories); see also George P. Smith, Toward an International Standard
of Scientific Inquiry, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 167, 169-70 (1992) (writing that "Galileo's legacy is his
animation of a movement designed to advance and, indeed, promote freedom of scientific
expression").
6. See James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of Imperial
Archaeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 24 (1992); see also Gene A. Marsh,
Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native American Remains and Sacred
Cultural Items, 24 ARz. ST. LJ. 79, 86 (1992) (noting that disinterring of remains runs a broad
spectrum, from "professional archaeologists" to "grave robbers").
7. There have also been rumblings among the scientific community that NAGPRA is
unconstitutional because it infringes on one's substantive liberty interests in freedom of
association or freedom of occupation, as well as a violation of the Establishment Clause's
requirement of the separation of church and state. However, both of these claims are beyond the
scope of this comment.
8. In 1996 the remains of a man where discovered near Kennewick, Washington. Eight
plaintiffs are suing the Army Corps of Engineers in order to gain access to the remains for further
scientific study, and are arguing in part that NAGPRA unconstitutionally infringes on their right
of scientific inquiry. The Army Corps of Engineers have refused these scientists access to the
remains, citing NAGPRA, and intend instead to grant the Umatilla tribe custody of the remains.
The court has not decided the merits of this claim. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army,
969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997) (Bonnichsen I); Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Or. 1997) (Bonnichsen I1).
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three compelling governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to further
these ends, any incidental infringement on scientific inquiry resulting from
NAGPRA is constitutionally permissible.
L The Legal Developments Leading to the Enactment of NAGPRA
Since the beginning of this century, the United States government has
continually adapted how it treats Native Americans, their ancestral skeletal
remains and other cultural items because of the shifting attitudes of
Americans towards science and the civil rights of Native Americans. The
way in which the legal system treats Native American burial sites and
associated objects historically conflicts with common law traditions; whereas
all jurisdictions agree that human remains may not be disinterred, once
properly buried, for less than "weighty and compelling reasons,"9
archaeologists and anthropologists routinely disturb Native American remains
"in the name of scientific curiosity."'0 The federal government's current
policy, which dictates that Native Americans themselves should be involved
in the decision of who, if anyone, should have custody of their ancestral
remains and other "cultural items," is a far cry from the previous legal
attitude toward these items." Four major pieces of legislation have been
passed regarding who retains custody of items recovered from Native
American burial sites evidence an evolution in legal treatment: first, the
American Antiquities Act of 1906; second, the Archaeological Resources
Preservation Act; third, the National Museum of the American Indian Act;
and lastly, the Native Americans Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990.
A. The Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906
At the turn of the century the federal government passed the American
Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906 (Antiquities Act), which legally
converted all Native American burial sites, funerary objects and human
remains into "objects of antiquity," or "archaeological resources," and thus
federal property." The government passed the Antiquities Act as a result
of the interest exhibited from both the scientific community and European
art and antiquities dealers in obtaining Native American skeletal remains,
particularly crania, and other funerary objects. 3 The Antiquities Act
9. See Walter E. Stem & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and
Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133, 160 (1995).
10. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property
in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REV. 559, 578 (1995).
11. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (1994).
12. See 16 U.S.C. § 470(d)(d) (1994).
13. See Leonard D. DuBoff, 53(2) Protecting Native American Cultures, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Nov. 1992, at 9, 10.
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subjected all grave site contents excavated under legal permits to permanent
"preservation" and study by suitable professionals.' The Antiquities Act is
considered the government's first official act which addressed the scientific
community's attitude that studying the remains found in Native American
graves was both a noble and legitimate pursuit. 5 However, in the wake of
the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, many Native and non-Native
Americans began to see the excavation of human remains and funerary
objects as mere graverobbing. 6 Also, excavation is sometimes characterized
as another example of a minority group being exploited by science and the
federal government. 7 In 1974, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v.
Diaz that the Antiquities Act's use of the term "object of antiquity" was
unconstitutionally vague because it did not adequately warn the public which
Native American ceremonial items they were prohibited from removing off
federally owned land."
B. Archaeological Resource Protection Act
In response to Diaz and the escalating debate between the proponents and
opponents of the excavation of skeletal remains, the Government passed the
Archaeological Resource Protection Act in 1979."9 The Archaeological
Resource Protection Act reinforced the legal construction that Native
American human and funerary remains were "archeological resources"
appropriately deemed federal property and therefore properly preserved by
federally funded universities, museums or other scientific or educational
institutions.' Specific examples of "archaeological resources" cited in the
Act are human graves and skeletal materials."' However, because the statute
expressly recognized Native American interests in burial objects located upon
their land, archaeologists and anthropologists could continue to excavate in
the name of science by averting this law and digging only on land federally
or privately owned.' However, the continued classification of remains as
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1994).
15. See Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 579.
16. See Afrasiabi, supra note 4, at 810-!I. Afrasiabi writes that the Indian Reburial
Movement of the 1970s, "concerned with past desecrations, strengthened politically and by the
1980s had developed significant political recognition. The movement mainly was composed of
tribal Native Americans, but also received strong support from people of different racial
backgrounds." lId
17. See Margaret B. Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains:
Approaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 151, 181 (1989).
18. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding the Antiquities
Act unconstitutionally vague and its enforcement provisions ineffective).
19. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470ii (1994).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(1) (1994); see also Leonard D. DuBoff, 500 Years After Columbus:
Protecting Native American Culture, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 43, 47 (1992).
21. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1994).
22. See John E. Peterson II, Dance of the Dead: A Legal Tango for Control of Native
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"resources" and conversion of human remains into "property" incensed those
who opposed burial desecration and arguably acted as a legitimizing shield
for those who were more interested in studying dead Native Americans than
respecting the living.'
C. National Museum of the American Indian Act
In response to their dissatisfaction with continued archaeological and
anthropological excavation under the Archaeological Resources Protection
Act, Native American activists began to demand the return of their ancestral
skeletons and funereal objects from museums, universities and science labs
for proper burial.' However, archaeologists and museum professionals
insisted that these human remains and other items were archaeological
resources - as defined by the Antiquities Act and the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act - and therefore not only belonged in display cases
and exhibits, but were essential to ongoing scientific studies examining, for
example, the migration of Native Americans across the Bering Straight.'
But in 1989 Congress passed the National Museum of the American Indian
Act which mandated that the Smithsonian Institute, which housed the largest
collection of Native American skeletal remains, inventory and repatriate the
Indian remains and grave goods in its collection to requesting tribes who
could present a preponderance of evidence showing they were familiarly
related to the remains.2
D. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990
But the National Museum of the American Indian Act proved
unsatisfactory to opponents of burial excavation because the legislation
applied only to items held by the Smithsonian.27 In response, Congress
passed the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990
(NAGPRA).28 Under NAGPRA, all federally funded museums and
institutions must identify the origin and cultural affiliation of their Native
American cultural items and repatriate these items to requesting tribes.~'
American Skeletal Remains, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 115, 117 (1990).
23. See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 3, at 43. Trope and Echo-Hawk wrote:
"Unfortunately, it has been common place for public agencies to treat Native American dead as
archeological resources, property, pathological material, data, specimens, or library books, but not
as human beings." Id.; see also Riding In, supra note 6, at 26.
24. See Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 583-84.
25. See ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & PAULETrE MOLIN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE
AMERICAN REtIGIONs 32 (1992).
26. See Pub. L. No. 101-185, Nov. 28, 1989, 103 Stat. 1226, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-
278, Oct. 9, 1996, 110 Stat 3355.
27. Id.
28. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
29. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72
IND. L.J. 723, 723 (1997).
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The legislative history of NAGPRA proves its purpose is to reinforce the
notion that "human remains must at all times be treated with dignity and
respect," as well as protect Native Americans' rights of possession to objects
needed to preserve or renew their traditional religion and culture." Thus,
NAGPRA and the National Museum of the American Indian Act represent
a "significant policy shift, enabling Native Americans to reclaim cultural
items that have long been in the custody of others," including many
archaeologists and anthropologists.3
However, NAGPRA has not resolved but merely redefined the debate
between Native Americans and the scientific community?2 For instance,
NAGPRA applies only to cultural items discovered on federal or tribal land
and to, items held by federally funded agencies and museums." Because
there was concern at the time of NAGPRA's inception that the statute would
effectuate a federal taking of property without due compensation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment,'M NAGPRA does not apply to items found on
private or state held land;35 to items currently held by institutions which do
not receive any federal money; or where a museum or archaeologist could
prove they were good faith purchasers of the item and thus, hold a legal
"right of possession."' Similarly, even federally funded institutions are not
required to repatriate cultural items if they hold a legal right of possession,
or where a tribe cannot establish, through a preponderance of evidence, that
they meet the statutory definition of the closest living "culturally affiliated"
group.3' NAGPRA also allows future excavation of burial sites on federal
or tribal land if the group conducting the excavation receives prior consent
from the lineal descendants of the remains.
Some argue that NAGPRA is overly broad and ambiguous. The NAGPRA
definition of "cultural items" encompasses "human remains," "associated
funerary objects," "unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects" and
30. See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 7, 9 (1990).
31. See Harding, supra note 29, at 723.
32. See Leora Frankel-Shlosberg, Conflicts Unearthed Along with Bones, DALLAS MORNINO
NEWS, Nov. 19, 1995, at 45A.
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(4), 3002 (1994).
34. See Daniel J. Hurtado, Native American Graves Protection And Repatriation Act: Does
It Subject Museums to an Unconstitutional Taking'? 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 1, 7, 14 (1993).
35. However, most states have passed statutes similar to NAGPRA or other burial legislation
to protect Native American graves from unnecessary disturbance. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
41-841 (1998).
36. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (1994); see also Hurtado, supra note 34, at 16-17.
37. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B) (1994). In Bonnichsen v. U.S. Department of the Army,
969 F. Supp. 628 (1997) (Bonnichsen I1), the court stated that "(tlhe following types of evidence
are used to make this determination: Geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folklore, oral tradition, historical, or other relevant information or
expert opinion." Id. at 637-38 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 10.14(a)).
38. See 25 U.S.C. §3002(c) (1994); see also Hurtado, supra note 34, at 19.
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"cultural patrimony." '39 In 1997, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
NAGPRA against a void-for-vagueness challenge by stating NAGPRA "is
not infirm because it fails to list examples of cultural items."'
IL What Is Really at Stake in the Debate over NAGPRA:
Is It Just Science Under Fire?
"Accused of being associated with war and deterioration of the natural
environment and social structure, science finds itself under fire on all
sides."'" Is this what is really going on? Is NAGPRA a legislative
manifestation of the notion that science is under fire in all arenas, including
archaeology and anthropology? In order to consider this question, one must
first understand the fundamental principles which Native Americans and
scientists disagree about.
A. Why Native Americans Demand Repatriation and Cessation of Further
Excavations Without Their Prior Consent
Those Native Americans who oppose the excavation and removal of
human skeletal remains and other grave goods hope to repatriate these items
because: first, their religion dictates that once these items are placed back
into the earth, they cannot be disinterred without causing great global
psychological and potentially physical harm to the living; second, many
Native Americans argue that scientific research utilizing these items is
unnecessary, intrusive and discriminatory; and third, because the repatriation
movement represents immense political consequences for Native Americans.
1. Religious Reasons for Opposing the Disinterment of Native
American Graves
To understand the arguments against the excavation and research
conducted on skeletal remains and other burial goods, it is important to
understand essential underlying Native American religious beliefs regarding
the spirit life after the physical body dies. Although there is not a single
belief or absolute truth among the numerous tribes, most all Native American
religions believe that life is a circular process which must not be
interrupted.42 Interruption occurs when human remains and their burial
objects are disinterred, thus trapping the spirit associated with the remains
on earth and halting its progression to its next stage.43 Disturbing skeletal
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (1994). "Cultural patrimony" is defined as "an object having
ongoing historical, traditional or cultural importance central to the Native American group or
culture itself." Id. § 3001(3)(D).
40. See United States v. Carrow, 119 F.3d 796, 804 (10th Cir. 1997).
41. See JJ. Salomon, Science and Scientists, in SCIENTIsTS IN SEARCH OF THEIR
CONSCIENCE 169 (Anthony R. Michaelis & Hugh Harvey eds., 1973).
42. See Bonnichsen 11, 969 F. Supp. at 632.
43. However, the Navajo believe that any disturbance of remains means that the ghosts, or
No. 2]
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remains and funeral objects also disturbs the spirits, who then bring
misfo'tune not only upon those who actually excavated the remains, but also
upon those who failed to protect the remains. " Thus, many Native
Americans regard NAGPRA as a prophylactic measure to prevent disturbing
these ghosts and bringing global misfortune.
2. Scientific Research is Unnecessary, Intrusive and Discriminatory
Aside from this religious belief about the active psychic lives of the
deceased, most Native Americans also oppose any disturbance of skeletal
remains because of the perceived oppression the practice causes. Native
Americans argue that science has never given a satisfactory explanation of
why Native American remains are more scientifically valuable than those of
white Americans, or why skeletal research is "necessary, proper or
beneficial."'4 Often Native Americans feel that the desire to research on
their ancestral skeletal remains is just another example of discrimination by
"racist state laws" which "deprive them of equal burial rights."'
In fact, one archaeologist who supports repatriation agrees that the process
of excavating remains is "victimizing and without scientific or moral
justification."'47 Many Native Americans believe that instead of acting in the
interest of scientific truth, archaeologists are motivated by furthering their
own professional careers "and tenure without giving anything back to the
tribe except disrespect, humiliation, and useless studies written in
incomprehensible jargon."' Vine Deloria, professor of history, law,
religious studies and political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
writes that science has "always been available as apologists for the majority
who wished to dehumanize minorities for commercial and political
purposes," which explains why most Native Americans generally distrust
scientists.49 Deloria further points out that only Native Americans "have
become the exclusive province (and property) of scholars to the extent that
ch'iidii, of the remains will plague the community of the living, Because of their great aversion
to the dead, the Navajo are requesting the repatriation of the ancestral bones, but instead of
burying them they are setting up their own museum in Window Rock, Arizona, for the
preservation of these remains in an effort to avoid further disturbance of the chiidii. See
CHARLOTTE J. FIusaiE, NAVAJO MEDICINE BUNDLES OR "JISH": ACQUISITION, TRANSMISSION,
AND DISPOSMON IN THE PAST AND PRESENT 332 (1987).
44. See FERGUS M. BORDEwicH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 173 (1996). Bordewich
states that some tribes "go so far as to blame alcoholism, AIDS and social disintegration on the
wandering spirits of the unshriven dead." Id.
45. See Riding In, supra note 6, at 26-27 (quoting Vine Deloria).
46. See id. at 26.
47. Riding In, supra note 6, at 28 (citing Lawrence Rosen, Give Indian Remains Back to
Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1988, at 30A).
48. See id. at 34.
49. See BORDEWICH, supra note 44, at 173.
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the bones of their dead can be disinterred with impunity to be displayed in
museum cases or used in speculative scientific experiments. '
And in June 1997, the Oregon district court concurred with these
sentiments. The court rejected the claim that NAGPRA was passed to utterly
foreclose scientific research utilizing Native American remains, but instead
the court found that it is merely intended to restrict the use of remains in
order to accord these remains the same dignity shown to non-Native
American remains." First, the court stated that "it is not aware of any
significant predominantly cultural objects and remains stolen from
predominantly Caucasian graveyards in the Unites States, or of museums
cataloguing thousands of Caucasian skeletons, or of any parallel to the 'pot-
hunters' who vandalize and desecrate Indian graves."' Additionally, the
court stated that "[tihe legislative history of NAGPRA also contains
extensive documentation of the abuses that led to the enactment of this
la w . ,5
3
Native Americans are also particularly offended by especially intrusive
scientific research, such as DNA analysis, which they consider "desecration
with devastating spiritual consequences."' Tissues subjected to DNA
analysis are inherently destroyed; therefore there exists the potential that
Native Americans would not have anything to repatriate after DNA analysis
is performed.5 DNA analysis is also particularly offensive to Native
Americans because it is generally used to identify tribal migration patterns
of ancient Native Americans, a goal which Native Americans find useless
and discriminatory. 6 Because Native Americans have their own genesis
stories, which do not include tribal migration but most often spirits rising
from the earth, Native Americans are not terribly interested in what science
has to tell them.' Sabastian LeBeau, repatriation officer of the Lakota tribe,
50. Id.
51. See Bonnichsen II, 969 F. Supp. at 649.
52. Id. (citing Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 3).
53. See Bonnichsen 1l, 969 F. Supp. at 649 (citing Protection ofNative American Graves and
the Repatriation of Human Remains and Sacred Objects: Hearings on H.R. 1381, H.R. 1646, and
H.R. 5237 before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990);
Native American Grave and Burial Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1021 and S. 1980 Before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990)).
54. See Courtenay Thompson & Richard L. Hill, Testing Possible for Kennewick Man,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Oct. 2, 1997, at D07.
55. See id.; see also Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric
Human Remains, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 369,377 (1998) (stating that "DNA analysis of bone
requires a sample to be powderized").
56. See VINE DELORIA, RED EARTH, WHITE LIEs 39 (1995) (refuting the Bering Straight
theory of migration).
57. See id.; see also Bill Dietrich, Skeleton Leads to Bones of Contention: Science Collides
with Tribal Beliefs, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1996, at A28; see also Leslie Alan Horvitz, Indians
No. 2]
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argued for the repatriation of skeletal remains slotted to become
archaeological study by stating "we never asked science to make a
determination as to our origins.""
It has been this historical discrimination, dehumanization, and
commodification which prompted Congress to pass NAGPRA under the
rubric of "civil rights" legislation." During the 1830s, two new "scientific"
disciplines, craniology and phrenology, advocated the excavation of Native
American remains as part of an attempt to ethnically categorize humans and
estimate intelligence based upon the size and shape of crania.' The purpose
of studying and comparing the skulls of Native Americans and other non-
Anglos was to bestow intelligence and morality rankings based on the ethnic
class. Ultimately, these "scientific" craniology and phrenological studies
detenmined all non-Anglos were intellectually and morally inferior." In
1868, the United States Surgeon General instituted his own crania study and
ordered that all troops stationed near Native American burial sites fulfill their
"patriot" duties and collect and contribute more "specimens" for the purposes
of the study.' It is estimated that all of the remains collected by the
Surgeon General's crania study are now "preserved" as part of the
Smithsonian's collection.'
3. NAGPRA's Political Consequences for Native Americans
Just as many Native Americans see NAGPRA as civil rights legislation,
many Native American leaders view NAGPRA as a major political
movement as well. Most Native American tribes feel they are losing their
identity; not only are they losing their ancestral bones and cultural items, but
living Native Americans are becoming "Americanized. ' For instance,
many Native Americans feel that "more than a few people in the scientific
and museum communities have had no contact with living Native
Americans," but only with Native American "bones, artifacts, and burial
and Anthropologists Are Battling over Old Bones, INSIGHT MAo., Nov. 18, 1996, at 40.
58. See George Johnson, Indian Tribes' Creationists Thwart Archaeologists, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1996, at Al, B6.
59. 136 CONG. REc. S17,173-02, S17,174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Inouye) (stating that the intent of Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act is to
protect the "civil rights of America's first citizens").
60. See John B. Winski, There Are Skeletons in the Closet: The Repatriation of Native
American Human Remains and Burial Objects, 34 ARiz. L. REV. 187, 191 (1992).
61. See id'
62. L; accord Harding, supra note 29, at 727.
63. See June Carnelle Bush Raines, Comment, One Is Missing: Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: An Overview and Analysis, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 639, 643
(1992) (noting that the Smithsonian stored "all but eighteen of... [the] 4000 skulls" collected
under the Surgeon General's study).
64. See BORDEWICH, supra note 44, at 171.
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sites." W. Richard West, attorney and director of the Museum of the
American Indian, as well as a member of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribe,
stated:
Repatriation is the most potent political metaphor for cultural
revival that is going on at this time. Political sovereignty and
cultural sovereignty are inextricably linked, because the ultimate
goal of political sovereignty is protecting of a way of life.'
Thus, many Native Americans view NAGPRA as a means of gaining
access to the political process. Under NAGPRA, museums and scientists
work directly with members of tribes in the identification, inventory and
possible repatriation of remains. This partnership has actually defused some
of the tensions between these two factions, and thus may increase the
likelihood of scientists retaining custody of remains where they can convince
a requesting tribe such research is legitimate and important.' NAGPRA
liberates not only the spirits of the dead, but also the spirits of living Native
Americans.
B. Arguments Regarding the Effects of NAGPRA on Science
Scientists have been particularly opposed to NAGPRA not because they
are interested in the possessions themselves,' but because of the potential
valuable data and historical information they represent.' Scientists,
museums, private art dealers, and historians are committed to preserving
history for the "public good,"7 and private art dealers testified that "Native
Americans should not be the sole conservators of their cultural items because
all Americans have a right to their history."'" Those who oppose
65. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 85.
66. See BoRDEwicH, supra note 44, at 171.
67. Increased political sovereignty is important because Native Americans would like to
represent themselves in Congress instead of relying on representation by members of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. See DELORIA, supra note 56, at 29. Deloria states that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs has most often totally ignored the needs of Native Americans - such as improved health
care, education and employment opportunities - and instead has fostered the cycle of Native
American dependence on the federal government. See id.
68. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 86-87. March writes: "The true professional archaeologist
is not concerned with the possession of artifacts as with the interpretation of the artifacts relative
to their position in the ground." Id.
69. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 117.
70. See Louis A. BRENNAN, BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO ARCHAEOLOGY 13 (1973) (stating that
an archaeologist's duty is to "contribute to the public good by committing oneself to
archaeological recovery of the remains of American prehistory").
71. See H. REP. No. 101-877, at 13 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4372
(comments during a legislative hearing presenting testimony from "professional scientific and
museum associations, archaeologists, representatives of individual museums, Indian organizations,
Tribal religious leaders, Native Hawaiian representatives, and private art dealers").
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repatriation and NAGPRA do so based upon: first, the fact that they feel they
owe humanity a duty to preserve the historical record; second, the fact that
ancient skeletal remains and grave goods lack sufficiently close links to
modern Native American tribes to justify repatriation to them; and third, the
threat that widescale repatriation will interrupt ongoing research.
1. Need to Preserve the Historical Record
The main argument for continued grave excavation is that the information
gathered through osteological research is unique and the importance of this
potential information overshadows any detrimental effects on the Native
American culture.' Scientists argue that not only is their research
necessary, but that they have a "right and responsibility" to examine the
remains.' The scientific community argues that they are meticulously
preserving the historical record which would otherwise likely be destroyed
or enormously altered should unregulated excavation and natural forces act
upon these burial sites.' Also, they argue that they must "intervene on
behalf of the common good" because Native Americans are working against
their own best interests by not studying these skeletal "artifacts" themselves
and instead demanding repatriation." Thus, most scientists feel that the
argument that their research destroys the culture of Native Americans is
absurd and that these opponents simply do not understand their work. 6
Douglas Ubelaker, a senior anthropologist at the National Museum of
National History, offers a moral defense of scientific research on skeletal
remains:
I explicitly assume that no living culture, religion, interest group,
or biological population has any moral or legal right to the
exclusive use or regulation of ancient human skeletons since all
humans are members of a single species, and ancient skeletons
are the remnants or unduplicable evolutionary events which all
living and future peoples have the right to know about and
understand. In other words, ancient skeletons belong to
everyone. 7
72. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 117-18.
73. See Report of the Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Relations
3 (Feb. 28, 1990) [hereinafter Panel Report], cited in Winski, supra note 60, at 189 n.28.
74. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 119.
75. See Bowman, supra note 17, at 151-52.
76. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 118; see also Gary D. Stumpf, A Federal Land
Management Perspective on Repatriation, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 303, 305 (1992).
77. See BORDEWICH, supra note 44, at 175 (quoting Douglas H. Ubelaker & Lauryn G.
Grant, Human Skeletal Remains: Preservation or Reburial?, 32 Y.B. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
249, 260 (1989)).
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2. Modem Native Americans Lack Preferential Familial Links to the
Skeletal Remains
Science presents another variation of this argument by claiming that
because cultures evolve so much, Native Americans today have no more
direct lineal ties, beyond basic cultural affiliation, to these skeletal remains
than do the rest of humanity.78 Thus, they conclude that because modern
Native Americans do not have stronger, or any more direct, genetic ties to
ancient remains than do non-Natives, their desire to repatriate the skeletal
remains should not be given precedent over the global benefit of gathering
archeological information.79 But Native Americans do feel akin to the
remains, regardless of how genetically affiliated they are, and feel that
skeletal remains of any ethnicity should remain undisturbed in order to show
dignity and respect for the life process and living individuals, not solely
respect to that person who has passed on.8"
This argument serves as the core of the debate regarding to whom the
remains of extinct tribespeople, such as the Salado and Hohokam of the
Southwest, should be repatriated. Scientists argue that where existing tribes
do not have a close familial link with these remains, in addition to the fact
that NAGPRA does not dictate to whom the remains of extinct tribes should
be repatriated, remains of this sort should remain federal property and not
subject to repatriation.8' Proponents of repatriation see this argument as the
most insidious and offensive argument because it denies the Native
Americans their own past.' For example, the Navajo point out that
although they recognize that the "prehistoric puebloan (Anasazi) ruins" found
on their reservation "are remnants of nonancestral people," they "consider the
sites sacred and respect them as places of the dead. Thus it is an affront to
Navajo religious beliefs for outsiders to disturb the bones of 'ancient
enemies' of their own ancestors."'
78. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 125.
79. See id. (noting in particular that scientists have argued that a Native American religious
desire for repatriation is inadequate justification); see also Stumpf, supra note 76, at 305.
80. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 121; see also Stumpf, supra note 76, at 305; Frankel-
Shlosberg, supra note 32, at 45A.
81. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 98, 100-01; see also Lannan, supra note 55, at 370. Lannan
wrote: "A controversial aspect that surfaced repeatedly throughout the enactment of NAGPRA
was the issue of what disposition should be required for prehistoric remains that have no
discernable affiliation with any present-day Native American tribe or organization ...
Anthropologists believed they should be returned as valuable resources for scientific studies." See
id.
82. See Larry J. Zimmerman, Archaeology, Reburial, and the Tactics of a Discipline's Self-
Delusion, AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J., Vol. 16, No. 2, at 37, 41 (1992).
83. See Deborah L. Nichols, Anthony L. Klesert & Roger Anon, Ancestral Sites, Shrines,
and Graves: Native American Perspective on the Ethics of Collecting Cultural Property, in THE
ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? 30 (Phyllis
Mauch Messenger ed., 1989). The authors are non-Native American archaeologists who work
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3. Interruption of Ongoing Research
Additionally, scientists oppose NAGPRA because of its potential to
interrupt or impede ongoing research.' The legislative history of NAGPRA
indicates scientists feared the repatriation of remains would result in science
losing the opportunity to conduct research, which they view as unacceptable,
particularly because research technologies are becoming increasingly
advanced.' Many archaeologists worry that important information and time
spent in ongoing research studies will be lost if the Native Americans are
granted absolute power to demand the immediate return of skeletal
remains.' Scientists argued any interruption or cessation of ongoing and
future research potentially prevents Native Americans not only from learning
about their ancestors, but about themselvesY
Thus, even those scientists sympathetic to the religious desires of the
Native Americans oppose NAGPRA because they fear it will eventually lead
to a sweeping and absolute repatriation movement. Although NAGPRA
specifically provides that remains and other goods shall not be repatriated if
they are part of an ongoing study,' archaeologists argue this provision does
not allow important studies on remains excavated since the passage of
NAGPRA because clearly these items could not be considered items of
ongoing research for the purposes of the statuteY Alternatively, these
scientists prefer a system of repatriation executed on a case-by-case basis
where those in possession of the remains have equal voice regarding who has
custody of the bones they are currently researching. '
with Native American tribes.
84. See Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 53.
85. During the legislative debates of NAGPRA, testimony from the scientific community
stressed that "if the remains are reburied now, they will be lost to science forever and not
reachable when future study techniques are developed." H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 13 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4372 (testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs on July 17, 1990).
86. See id
87. See Winski, supra note 60, at 189 (citing Panel Report, supra note 73, at 13).
88. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b) (1994).
89. The Bonnichsen plaintiffs initially claimed the right to study the Kennewick Man remains
under 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b), NAGPRA's provision which allows scientific institutions to retain
items, after a repatriation request, "indispensable for completion of a specific study, the outcome
of which would be of major benefit to the United States." Response to Defendants Motion for
Summar Judgment, at 15-16, 15 n.3 (CV No. 96-1481 E) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b)),
However, bacause excavation of the Kennewick Man occurred six years after NAGPRA took
effect, this provision could not apply and thus section 3003(b)(2) applies, which states that after
a repatriation request of a newly excavated item, "initiation of new scientific studies of such
remains and associated funerary objects" are prohibited without the consent of the culturally
affiliated tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(2) (1994).
90. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 98-100. Marsh wrote that scientists and museums feared "a
wholesale raid on their collections." See id. at 98. Furthermore, writes Marsh, "[s]ome
archaeologists and anthropologists expressed concern that the federal legislation would preempt
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Il1. The Alleged Scientific Right of Scientific
Inquiry as Applied to NAGPRA
Legal scholars, particularly in the last twenty years, have argued that the
First Amendment freedom of expression encompasses or indicates that there
is also a fundamental right of scientific inquiry." However, no court has
explicitly held that such a right exists. A recent discovery of ancient skeletal
remains in Washington state, dubbed the "Kennewick Man," has rekindled the
debate over whether such a right exists, and if so, whether NAGPRA
unconstitutionally infringes on scientific inquiry.Y This section will discuss:
first, the constitutional challenge to NAGPRA based on the perceived First
Amendment right of scientific inquiry brought by plaintiffs in the Kennewick
Man case; second, three different theories under which this right may be
recognized; and lastly, assuming, arguendo, that there is a fundamental right
of scientific inquiry, whether NAGPRA is an unconstitutional infringement on
this right.
A. Imminent Constitutional Challenge to NAGPRA Based on a Perceived
First Amendment Right to Scientific Inquiry
In 1996, researchers unearthed a set of human remains near Kennewick,
Washington 3 These remains, nicknamed the "Kennewick Man," startled
researchers because initial radiocarbon dating of the remains indicated the
skeleton was at least 9000 years old," and because initial research indicated
the remains were in fact Caucasoid, not Native American 5 In accordance
their own efforts to develop policies governing the disposition of remains and artifacts. Congress
felt, however, that there should be common standards and mechanisms to resolve these
issues ...." See id. at 99.
91. The announcement that a sheep had been cloned from an adult mammary cell has
rekindled the debate whether such a right exists, and if it does, whether the federal government's
ban on using federal funding to support such research is an unconstitutional violation of this right.
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission stated:
Therefore, even if scientific inquiry were found to be a constitutionally protected
activity, the government could regulate to protect against compelling harms, such
as the current physical risks posed by the prospective use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer techniques to create children. The freedom to pursue knowledge is
distinguishable from the right to choose the method for achieving that knowledge,
since the method itself may be permissibly regulated.
National Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 79 (June 1997).
92. Plaintiffs in the suit seeking to conduct extensive studies on the Kennewick Man before
repatriation to the Umatilla tribe argue that there is a right of scientific inquiry and that
repatriation of the remains will foreclose further scientific research and thus, unconstitutionally
infringe on this right. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 645-46
(1997) (Bonnichsen I1).
93. See id. at 631. These remains are also referred to as the "Richland Man."
94. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 614, 617 (1997) (Bonnichsen 1).
95. For example, James Chatters, the first forensic anthropologist to examine the remains,
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with NAGPRA, the Army Corps of Engineers' published a "Notice of Intent
to Repatriate Human Remains," stating that the remains were believed to be
those of a Native American male and asked any tribe believing itself to be
"culturally affiliated" with the remains to contact the Corps of Engineers.'
Shortly after publication of the Notice to Repatriate, three scientists
individually wrote the Corps of Engineers arguing that Kennewick Man
represented a unique discovery of national and international interest and
repatriation of the remains would foreclose any further examination of the
remains." After the Corps of Engineers failed to respond to their letters or
to reconsider their decision to repatriate Kennewick Man, "a group of
scientists (the Bonnichsen plaintiffs) filed suit seeking a temporary restraining
order to halt the repatriation," and also "demanded a detailed scientific study
to determine the origins of the man before the Corps decided whether to
repatriate the remains.""
In their complaint, the Bonnichsen plaintiffs argued in part that any
repatriation of Kennewick Man would unconstitutionally violate their right of
initially saw that the Kennewick Man's skull "had a very large number of Caucasoid features,"
and that the skeleton was that of a middle-aged male who was about five foot nine, "much taller
than most prehistoric Native Americans in the Northwest." Douglas Preston, A Reporter at Large:
The Lost Man, NEw YORKER, June 16, 1997, at 70. A second forensic archaeologist, Catherine
J. MacMillen, concurred with the findings that the Kennewick Man was a Caucasian male. See
id.; see also Dietrich, supra note 57, at A28.
96. The Army Corps of Engineers took custody of Kennewick Man soon after scientists,
excavating on federal land under a permit issued pursuant to the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, preliminarily radiocarbon-dated the remains. See Bonnichsen 1, 969 F. Supp. at
617.
97. See id. at 618.
98. See id (quoting the Bonnichsen Complaint). These scientists who wrote letters to the
Army Corps of Engineers, but did not receive responses, were: Douglas Owsley, "an expert on
Paleo-American remains" and the Division Head for Physical Anthropology at the National
Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution; Richard L. Jantz, a biological anthropologist
at the University of Tennessee; and Robson Bonnichsen, the director of the Center for the Study
of the First Americans, at Oregon State University. See Preston, supra note 95, at 72-73.
99. See Bonnichsen I, 969 F. Supp. at 618. The Asatru Folk Assembly, described by their
Complaint as a church "that represents Asatru, one of the major indigenous, pre-Christian,
European religions," id., also filed suit asking the court to compel the Corps of Engineers to allow
further scientific testing of the remains in order to determine whether the remains are Native or
non-Native. The Asatru contend that if in fact Kennewick Man is non-Native, they request
custody of the remains "for study and 'for eventual reinterment in accordance with native
European belief.'" Id. at 619. (The Asatru and Bonnichsen claims were joined for the purposes
of these hearings.) A physical anthropologist, Grover S. Krantz, who examined the Kennewick
Man remains prior to being taken into custody by the Army Corps of Army Engineers, reported
that the Kennewick Man exhibited characteristics common to both Europeans and Plains Indians,
but concluded that "this skeleton cannot be racially or culturally associated with any existing
American Indian group," and that "[tihe Native Repatriation Act has no more applicability to this
skeleton than it would if an early Chinese expedition had left one of its members there." Preston,
supra note 95, at 72.
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scientific inquiry by foreclosing access to the remains." Magistrate Judge
John Jelderks of the United States District Court of Oregon has thus far issued
a temporary restraining order to halt immediate repatriation of the remains,''
and remanded the issue to the Corps of Engineers for further consideration
regarding whether to allow additional scientific study before repatriation, or
whether to repatriate the Kennewick Man at all." The court did not decide
the merits of the claim but suggested that the Corps of Engineers "carefully
scrutinizes" this claim because of its potential validity." However, the court
twice stated that "[t]he remains shall continue to be stored in a manner that
preserves their potential scientific value."'" Notably lacking in this order,
however, was that Magistrate Judge Jelderks did not state that the remains
should also be stored in a manner that preserves their dignity.
Yet in May 1998, Judge Jelderks ordered a hearing "to review the
adequacy of the present curation protocols" of the facility storing the
Kennewick Man." The order came after "[a] succession of incidents and
disclosures during the preceding months [that] has raised serious questions
concerning both the physical security and scientific integrity of the human
remains at issue in this action.""' Judge Jelderks also wrote:
The security of the skeletal remains and the storage conditions are
especially important because it is very likely that some scientific
analysis and testing of the remains will be necessary to address
the issues that have been raised in this case."
100. See Bonnichsen v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 646 (1997) (Bonnichsen
I). The Umatilla tribe, to whom the Army Corps of Engineers decided should receive custody
of the remains, has stated that they support a "reasoned and scientific approach to resolving these
issues, including limited scientific nondestructive testing." Thompson & Hill, supra note 54, at
D07. Thus it is unlikely that the Umatilla would allow the DNA analysis the Bonnichsen
plaintiffs are requesting because DNA analysis destroys the bones upon which it is conducted.
See id.
101. See Bonnichsen 1, 969 F. Supp. at 619.
102. See Bonnichsen 11, 969 F. Supp. at 654.
103. The court instead ordered that both the Asatru and the Bonnichsen plaintiffs and the
Corps of Engineers "provide the court with "quarterly status reports" regarding the matter, the first
one being due on Oct. 1, 1997. Id. (stating that this hearing "primarily is a discovery motion").
104. ld. at 645, 654.
105. See Judge Jelderks Demands the Parties Convene, TRi-CTrv HERALD ONuNE
(Kennewick, Pasco, Richland, Wash.) (visited Aug. 17, 1998) <http://www.tri-
cityherald.com/bones/documentsijelderks.html> (Judge Jelderk's Order of May 13, 1998).
106. Id. Among the incidents that prompted the hearing was the allegation that "some
remains believed to be part of the same individual were kept in a box with animal bones and
unrelated human remains; and ... some of the remains at issue are now unaccounted for or were
taken from defendants' custody and buried. .... " d.
107. Id.
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B. Analysis of the Alleged Constitutional Right to Scientific Inquiry ,
In 1976, Professor Thomas Emerson, a First Amendment expert, warned
that the constitutionality of governmental regulation and restrictions of
scientific research were "hard problems... now looming on the horizon" of
First A anendment law,"m but that "[t]here could be no doubt that the First
Amendment provides extensive protection to freedom of scientific
research."'" Although neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court have
explicitly spoken on the matter, many legal scholars have argued that the First'
Amendment provides a degree of protection for scientific research, or a "right
of scientific inquiry."'. The Supreme Court has stated that the First
Amendment is "broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are
nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." M
But even the explicit constitutional protection of speech, or expression, may
be governmentally regulated as long as the restrictions are "rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest."
2
Thus, if courts should find that the First Amendment protects scientific
inquiry, NAGPRA could still survive a constitutional challenge by
representing a compelling and legitimate governmental interest and therefore
any restrictions NAGPRA may incidentally impose on scientific inquiry may
constitute permissible and legitimate governmental regulation. This comment
will examine three potential manifestations of the right to scientific inquiry
argument: first, the claim that the Framers of the constitution recognized the
value of scientific thought and implicitly protected scientific inquiry in the
First Amaendment; second, the claim that scientific inquiry is inherently
expressive and thus falls under First Amendment protection; and lastly, that
the First Amendment protection of expression encompasses scientific inquiry
because it is a necessary precursor to scientific speech.
1. A Historical Perspective of the Alleged Right of Scientific Inquiry
Legal scholars argue that the Framers of the Constitution, writing during
the Enlightenment era's emphatic support of science, undoubtedly recognized
108. See Natasha C. Lisman, Freedom of Scientific Research: A Frontier Issue in First
Amendment Law, BOSTON BJ., Nov.Dec. 1991, at 4, 4 (Emerson made this comment with
reference to the legislature's efforts to regulate recombinant DNA research); cf. Gary L. Francione,
Experimntation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417,
420 (1987).
109. See Science Policy Implications of DNA Recombinant Molecule Research: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and
Technology, 95th Cong. 875 (1977); see also Francione, supra note 108, at 420.
110. See Francione, supra note 108, at 418-19.
111. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
112. See Francione, supra note 108, at 423.
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the importance of a constitutional right of scientific inquiry and intended the
First Amendment's freedom of expression to include scientific research and
experimentation."' Many legal scholars have relied upon the "marketplace
of ideas" analysis to conclude that because "scientific research generates
epistemologically superior input into the marketplace of ideas," the Framers
of the Constitution intended to include scientific inquiry as protected
expression."4 Thomas Emerson argued that because the Framers accepted
that free expression is "vital to the process of discovering truth, through
exposure to all the facts," and that this free expression "developed in
conjunction with, and as an integral part of, the growth of the scientific
method," that the right of scientific inquiry is predicated on marketplace
theory." 5 Similarly, Gary Francione, analyzing this right of scientific inquiry
under a marketplace theory, wrote that:
although much constitutional history may be vague, history
indicates clearly that the founders were unequivocally enthusiastic
about scientific inquiry, and that this enthusiasm influenced the
formation of constitutional concepts, including the first
amendment."6
Another legal scholar wrote that Thomas Jefferson regarded "the worlds of
science and public welfare [as] evidently one," each was a "self-nourishing
marketplace.""" Thus, Jefferson believed that "[i]f passing legislation would
help one [marketplace], it would help the other."". Accordingly then,
passing legislation which impairs the science marketplace will necessarily
impair the public welfare marketplace."9
113. See Lisman, supra note 108, at 4-5; see also Francione, supra note 108, at 422.
114. See Francione, supra note 108, at 422 (citing James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and
the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639, 647 (1979) (claiming unregulated scientific
expression promotes the discovery of scientific truth); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right
to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1251 (1977) (arguing the utility
of scientific inquiry is to be decided within the marketplace of ideas); Richard Delgado & David
R. Millen, God, Galileo, and the Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific
Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 361-71 (1978); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948); Thomas Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the
First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 741 (1977) [hereinafter Emerson, Colonial
Intentions]). Francione notes that although Ferguson, Robertson, and Delgado and Millin do
accept marketplace theory, they do not rest their argument solely on marketplace analysis. Id.
115. See Emerson, Colonial Intentions, supra note 114, at 740-41.
116. See Francione, supra note 108, at 428 (citing IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE
CONSTITUTION 3-12 (1985)); Delgado & Millen, supra note 114, at 354-61; Steven Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 2-7).
117. See Francione, supra note 108, at 428 (quoting CARMEN, supra note 116, at 10)
118. See id.
119. And in fact, in 1793 Thomas Jefferson became the first famous American to endorse
burial excavation by "virtue of a higher order called science" when he systematically excavated
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However, even if the historical context suggests that the Framers intended
the First Amendment to protect free scientific inquiry, one cannot reasonably
argue that this includes an absolute right of scientific inquiry, free from
acceptable governmental regulation on research and experimentation."n For
example, even though the Framers explicitly protected the right to patent one's
inventions,' the Supreme Court has held that this right is not absolute.'"
And the Supreme Court has long held that "incidental infringement on the
freedom of speech" is acceptable where the government can provide a
"sufficiently compelling governmental interest."' '
The determination that there is a constitutional right of scientific inquiry,
however, "does not dispose of the issue.'""4 The implicit right of scientific
inquiry could not absolutely protect any type of inquiry, regardless of its
specific or global impact. Scientific research and experimentation are both
currently subject to limitations. For example, in the medical context, research
may be restricted based on the perceived good of the particular subject
involved or society as a whole.'" Dignity and respect for human life dictate
and removed the remains of over 1000 known Native American graves on his plantation, See
Riding In, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting JOHN C. GREENE, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON xiii (1984)). Under common law, "protected cemeteries were only those burial
grounds found within the church yard," and, therefore, scientists were virtually free to excavate
Native American graves without any legal accountability. Harding, supra note 29, at 762, Thus,
Jefferson and other scientists, legitimated the practice and paved the road for future "scientific"
studies utilizing Native American remains to prove their moral and intellectual inferiority. See
Winski, .rupra note 60, at 191; see also discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the use of Native
American remains in scientific examinations to prove their, and other non-Anglos, inferiority).
But this practice also implicated the civil rights of Native Americans by summarily disinterring
only non-Anglo graves for the purposes of "scientific" studies or to display the grave goods and
remains as objects of curiosity in museums. Cf. Winski, supra note 60, at 192 (stating that the
museums were only interested in the burial goods but that human remains were inevitably
"incidentally" excavated).
120. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) ("The guaranties of freedom of
expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no
absolute protection for every utterance.").
121. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (designating the legislative branch powers "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
122. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding that not every discovery falls under
patent protection; for example, one cannot patent naturally occurring phenomenon or organisms).
123. See June Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1390 (1996); see,
e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (no absolute constitutional protection of
pornography); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (no constitutional protection for
inciting speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (no absolute constitutional
protection for libelous speech).
124. See Lisman, supra note 108, at 5 (stating that "scientific inquiry must be protected to
some degree, but the question remains as to the scope of the protection," in particular, which
processes or stages of scientific experimentation are covered).
125. See Smith, supra note 5, at 167.
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there could not be a First Amendment right of free expression to sever the
limbs of children as part of a scientific experiment studying the psychological
and physiological effects of pain. Similarly, Congress passed NAGPRA as a
means of according dignity and respect for deceased and living Native
Americans where it mandated that scientists wishing to utilize skeletal remains
and other cultural items held by federally funded institutions, or uncovered on
federal or tribal land, must first seek the consent of the tribe culturally
affiliated with those items." In sum, standing alone this "marketplace of
ideas" theory is insufficient justification upon which to ground a right to
scientific inquiry which is free of governmental restrictions.2 '
2. Scientific Inquiry as Inherently Expressive Conduct and Therefore
Encompassed Within the First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." Therefore, many legal scholars
have argued that if scientific inquiry is inherently expressive conduct, it is
necessarily encompassed within the right of free speech "and there is no need
for any special first amendment protection."'" And indeed, scientific inquiry
would fall within the scope of the First Amendment where it "involves
nonverbal conduct but that such nonverbal conduct is nonetheless
expressive."'' But it is arguable that all scientific research is inherently
expressive, and therefore further analysis is warranted.
The Supreme Court has held that some symbolic, nonverbal expression
falls within the scope of the First Amendment protection of free
expression,' leading some legal scholars to analogize that like symbolic
126. See discussion supra Part II.A.I. Because Native Americans feel that the dead have
active psychic lives, they feel that scientific research on skeletal remains disturbs active spirits
and thus brings global misfortune. Recognizing this belief of the status of "dead" Native
Americans, Congress deemed it appropriate for scientists wishing to use these remains to obtain
the consent of living tribal members to research utilizing these remains, thereby alleviating the
concern that Native American burial sites and bodies were not accorded the same measure of
dignity and protection afforded non-Native graves. And one could not argue that the history of
craniological and phrenological "scientific" studies motivated to prove Native Americans were
biologically morally and intellectually inferior could be considered research which preserves the
dignity of living Native Americans by today's standards. Thus, Congress allowed a subjective
determination of the sorts of research Native American remains and cultural items would be
utilized in. This means that they enacted NAGPRA to give culturally affiliated tribes the ability
to withhold consent for research they deemed not warranting the continued disinterment of their
dead. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
127. Also, as Francione pointed out, "using marketplace theory to protect experimentation"
raises other problems, such as "problematic interpretations of 'expression' or [that] require content
discrimination in the guise of an appeal to 'true' or 'valid' science." Francione, supra note 108,
at 423.
128. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
129. See Francione, supra note 108, at 423.
130. See id. at 431.
131. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (constitutional free expression
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speech, scientific research is an expressive activity "like demonstrating, and
conduct (experimentation or marching) that facilitates or is functional with
respect to the ultimate expression (research or demonstration) is itself speech
plus protected by the first amendment."'3 But the Supreme Court has also
rejected the notion that a "limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea."'33 In Clark v. Community for Non-Violence, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that "all conduct is presumptively expressive,"'' and held
instead that "it is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in allegedly
expmssive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even
applies.""13  Thus, according to Gary Francione, "many instances of
experimentation would, even after Clark, be accorded at least prima facie"
constitutional protection where the research is solely communicative. 3
Alternatively, however, Clark also means that if a particular experiment or
project "lacks independently communicative aspects, then there is nothing
inherent . . . that makes conduct expressive merely because it is
facilitative;" 3' and therefore "purely facilitative conduct, not itself
communicative, would not be protected."'3 Thus, Francione wrote that "if
the state were to regulate purely facilitative conduct for nonspeech reasons,
such ats the protection of animal subjects from cruel treatment - a traditional
concern of both state and federal legislation - then the first amendment
would not even be implicated.' 39
And where research "does not involve communication and if government
regulation of nonexpressive experimental activity is not intended to suppress
the dissemination of information, then . . . restrictions on experimentation
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.""10 If this
is the case, if scientific inquiry is subject to the rational basis test of minimal
judicial scrutiny, then restrictions and regulations on research "may be found
includes affixing a peace symbol to the flag); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969) (constitutional free expression includes marching); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (constitutional free expression includes wearing
armbards); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (constitutional free expression
includes nonviolent demonstrations).
132. See Francione, supra note 108, at 433 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
133. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
134. See Clark v. Community for Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
135. See id. This means that a person seeking expressive conduct protection must satisfy the
Spence test which states that the person engaging in First Amendment protected expressive
conduct must intend that actual or potential observers of the activity understand the message the
person is trying to convey. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
136. See Francione, supra note 108, at 441-42.
137. See id.
13:3. See id. at 438-49.
139. See id. at 471.
140. See id. at 423.
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to be permissible even though the government interest advanced is thought to
be 'trivial' in comparison to the loss of knowledge produced by such
research.'
4
'
Similarly, NAGPRA is a federal regulation of purely facilitative conduct
for nonspeech reasons: it is the regulation of the disinterment of human
remains and other burial objects on federal or tribal land to ensure these
remains are accorded the same dignity as non-Native American remains.
These governmental interests are surely not trivial. And NAGPRA is not a
prohibition against scientific research utilizing these remains or the prohibition
of the dissemination of information gleaned from such research; NAGPRA
simply requires tribal consent for research utilizing skeletal remains
identifiably culturally affiliated with that tribe and which are held by
institutions receiving federal funding or uncovered on federal or tribal
land."4 Additionally, NAGPRA does not speak to the ability of
disseminating information gleaned through the use of Native American
skeletal remains whatsoever. Arguably then, the First Amendment would
not even be implicated and NAGPRA "need only be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. ' 4
In the event that courts decide NAGPRA is merely regulation of
nonexpressive scientific activity and therefore the free speech protection is not
implicated, NAGPRA could withstand the rational basis standard of
permissible statutory infringement on scientific inquiry. It is likely that just
this governmental interest, prohibiting discriminatory treatment of Native
American remains and cultural items, pitted against the alleged loss of some
scientific data resulting from repatriation under NAGPRA could meet the
minimal judicial scrutiny test. However, as discussed infra, numerous other
compelling and legitimate governmental interests are enforced through
NAGPRA and, taken aggregately, these governmental interests are clearly
sufficient to warrant restrictions on the collection of research "specimens"
particularly skeletal human remains.
141. la at 424.
142. One could not argue that NAGPRA is a prohibition against skeletal research because
scientists are still free, subject to state law, to research using remains unearthed on private and
state lands or on remains held by non-federally funded institutions. Additionally, scientists may
utilize remains covered by NAGPRA as long as they obtain tribal consent.
143. However, scientists now sometimes argue that their ability to publish is severely
affected by NAGPRA because their ability to gather data for research has been undermined
because tribes are now generally able under NAGPRA to prohibit skeletal remains and other
cultural items from being used in research they find inappropriate. Thus, these scientists argue
that the tribes are in effect quashing their ability to publish. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
144. See Francione, supra note 108, at 423.
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3. Research as a Necessary Precursor to Scientific Speech and
Therefore Protected by the First Amendment
Other scholars argue not that the alleged right of scientific inquiry is
inherently expressive and thus protected by the First Amendment, but that
because research is a necessary precursor to "the dissemination of scientific
expression," scientific research deserves First Amendment protection as
well." These scholars argue that because the information-gathering stage
that "is a precondition to news-reporting" is oftentimes protected, similarly
"experimentation [which] is a precondition to scientific expression" warrants
First Amendment protection."
John A. Robertson argues that because scientific experimentation and
research is "an essential step in the process of dissemination of ideas and
information, research should have the same constitutional status as
disserination itself."'47 The linchpin of his argument is that because the
publication of scientific data is protected by the First Amendment, conducting
research necessary to obtain this data should also be protected.'48 In fact,
"the Supreme Court has included many precursors to speech in the broad
protection of the First Amendment." 49
For example, in Buckley v. Valeo'" and First National Bank of Boston v.
Belotti," the Supreme Court granted First Amendment protection to the
financing of speech because this speech was a necessary precursor to ultimate
political speech. The Court in Buckley stated that the distinction between what
is constitutionally protected precursive action versus speech should not be
formalistically applied, but:
rather with sensitivity to the relationship between the conduct in
question and the First Amendment values. When conduct serves
as an important vehicle for a protected activity, or constitutes a
form of such activity itself, it falls within the scope of the First
Amendment."
145. See id. at 459.
146. See id. at 461.
147. See Robertson, supra note 114, at 1225 n.89. Robertson stated that "much acquisition
research [such as the social sciences] involves activities traditionally protected by the first
amendment, such as speaking, talking, writing, and publishing. . . .Similarly, scientific
publications would ordinarily be protected by first amendment rights to publish." Id.
148. See id. at 1251-53.
149. See Coleman, supra note 123, at 1389.
150. 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
151. 435 U.S. 765, 788-92 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment protections extended
to commercial speech).
152. See Lisman, supra note 108, at 5.
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Additionally, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment not only protects a teacher's or a student's ultimate speech,
but also the learning process, including the right "to inquire, to study and to
evaluate," which is the precursor to their ultimate speech."
Other scholars draw on the theory that scientific data is a precursor to
scientific speech and argue by analogy that just as information-gathering is
sometimes protected in the news reporting context, information-gathering in
the scientific context should also receive constitutional protection." 4 The
theory then, writes Francione, is that because the Supreme Court "has refused
to treat the public differently than the press, and ... scientists, as members
of the public,"'5 5 should be granted a "presumption of first amendment
protection for all experimental activity on the ground that it is indispensable
information-gathering."'" Indeed the Supreme Court has held that
information-gathering for news reporting may be encompassed within the First
Amendment protection of free speech.
For example, the Supreme Court held in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia
that the public right of access to criminal trials included a newspaper reporter
acting in an information-gathering capacity." The Court drew on dicta in
Zemel v. Rusk... and Branzburg v. Hayes"9 and held that physical access
to information for the purposes of news reporting is sometimes protected by
the First Amendment, particularly if the sole reason for denying or restricting
access to the information is a measure of inhibiting the ultimate dissemination
of that information." ° The Supreme Court recognized in Branzberg that
"[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of the organized
press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists,
153. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
154. See Francione, supra note 108, at 466-73. This argument builds on the analogy that
because courts have sometimes recognized First Amendment protection for information-gathering
in the news-reporting context, courts should also recognize protection for information-gathering
in the scientific context. See id.
155. See id. at 466.
156. See id. at 471. However, as Francione points out, "such a presumption is not justified
by existing case law, which suggests that information-gathering, divorced from the actual
processes of communication" is not absolutely protected. See id.
157. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
158. 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (holding that the denial of a passport in order for travel to
Cuba for information-gathering purposes did not unconstitutionally violate the plaintiff's First
Amendment right of free speech).
159. 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding that the requirement that newsmen testify before
state or federal grand juries does not abridge the right to free speech).
160. Justice Stevens, concurring in Richmond Newspapers, stated that "never before [had the
Court] squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional
protection whatsoever," but that the Court had only concerned itself with restrictions on
information-gathering where such restrictions prohibited the ultimate dissemination of the
information. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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academic researchers, and dramatists.'.'. Thus, scholars argue that the Court
implicitly acknowledged the necessity of scientific inquiry as an information-
gathering stage and that if restrictions on physical access to potential scientific
data are in place solely to restrict the ultimate dissemination of scientific
speech, such restrictions unconstitutionally abridge the right of free
speech."
Yet, Justice Brennan, concurring in Richmond Newspapers, stated "the
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless," and that "[a]n assertion of
the prerogative to gather information must accordingly be assayed by
considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded.""
Similarly, Francione persuasively argues, even if a prima faie right to
precursive action or information-gathering which would encompass the right
to scientific inquiry could be asserted, "there simply is no reason why the first
amendment should accord greater protection to the preconditions of scientific
speech than to the preconditions of other speech."'64 Thus, just as
constitutionally protected verbal speech may be permissibly governmentally
regulated in certain instances, so would the implicit right of scientific
inquity."
C. Assuming There Is a First Amendment Right of Scientific Inquiry,
NAGPRA Represents a Constitutionally Permissible Infringement on This
Right
Assuming, arguendo, courts find that the First Amendment definitely
protects precursive speech or protects information-gathering in the scientific
context, NAGPRA represents compelling governmental interests and is a
constitutional infringement on this right to research."M In United States v.
O'Brien, the Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to analyze whether
governmental regulations of conduct impermissibly violated the right to free
expression:
161. See Branzberg, 408 U.S. at 705.
162. See Francione, supra note 108, at 471-73.
163. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (remarking further
that "[t]he judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical necessities as it is of abstract
reasoning").
164. See Francione, supra note 108, at 465.
165. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) (holding that a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest can constitutionally restrict speech where "speech" and
"nonspeech" are bound together); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (holding that slight
infringements on freedom of the press acceptable where a state's interest in security was at stake).
166. The Supreme Court has recognized a myriad of balancing tests to determine whether
governmental regulations of speech and expression unconstitutionally infringe on the First
Amendment, but the cornerstone of these cases is that governmental regulations which do unduly
restrict communication or symbolic conduct, or that are enacted solely to prevent the ultimate
dissemination of information, are constitutional. See Delgado & Millen, supra note 114, at 390-
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[G]ovemment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial Governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.,67
In sum, under the O'Brien test, even if there were a prima facie right to
scientific inquiry, a First Amendment challenge to NAGPRA would be
unsuccessful because: first, the government has a compelling interest in
restricting the use of skeletal remains and other burial goods in scientific
research; and secondly, NAGPRA is narrowly tailored to those ends.
1. NAGPRA Is a Legitimate Exercise of Governmental Restrictions of
the Alleged Right of Scientific Inquiry
Where there is a sufficiently compelling governmental interest, restrictions
which incidentally infringe on constitutionally protected free speech are
acceptable." In the area of regulating research and experimentation,
"protection of the dignity and welfare" of society "surely constitute compelling
justifications for the imposition of safeguards.""lw NAGPRA undoubtedly
permissibly infringes on any right of scientific inquiry because it represents
at least three compelling governmental interests: first, assigning Native
American remains burial rights equal to non-Native graves; second, according
Native Americans the same sort of quasi-property rights in their ancestral
remains granted to all others; and third, granting Native Americans control of
their image after death.
a) Respecting the Integrity of Native American Burial Sites Is a
Compelling Governmental Interest
The most obvious governmental interest reflected through NAGPRA is the
goal of ending discriminatory treatment of Native American burial sites and
skeletal remains, "undoing an injustice that began so long ago."'7 NAGPRA
167. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
168. See id. at 376 (holding that a sufficiently compelling governmental interest can
constitutionally restrict speech where "speech" and "nonspeech" are bound together); Pell, 417
U.S. at 835 (holding that slight infringements on freedom of the press acceptable where a state's
interest in security was at stake).
169. See Lisman, supra note 108, at 7 (stating also that the preservation of public health and
the environment also constitute compelling governmental interests warranting restrictions on
scientific inquiry); see also Coleman, supra note 123, at 1392 (arguing that "society's collective
conscience or morality" could not solely justify restrictions on scientific inquiry, nor could the
state justify restrictions based on a desire to prohibit new knowledge).
170. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,173-02, S17,174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Inouye). Senator lnouye then described how the United States government itself was responsible
for legitimizing "robbing graves" of the Native Americans, particularly under the orders of the
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is hailed as "civil rights" legislation, a measure to assure that Native American
graves and skeletal remains receive respect and dignity equal to non-Native
graves and remains.' Members of Congress characterized the practice of
unquestioningly disinterring Native American graves as "flagrantly violat[ing]"
the "civil rights of America's first citizens"'" and not only undermining the
dignity of Native Americans, but the rest of the American people as well.'
Accordingly, Congress recognized that there is a compelling governmental
interest in protecting all burial sites and remains from unconsented to
excavation. 74
But morality and value judgments alone insufficiently justify restrictions
on the right of free speech. So if scientific inquiry is accorded First
Amendment protection, whether Congress considered scientific research on
Native American skeletal remains immoral is unimportant. For example, the
Supreme Court held that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance . . . have the full protection of the [First Amendment]
guarantees." Thus, according to the Court, the morality or value judgments
of some cannot override others' rights of free expression.'7" But the arbitrary
and discriminatory protection of a minority's burial rights is not a mere issue
of morality; it is an issue of equality. 76 The Supreme Court and our
Army Surgeon General in the nineteenth century. Id.
171. See id. (statement of Sen. Inouye) (stating that the intent of Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act is to protect the "civil rights of America's first citizens"); see also
Livesay, supra note 1, at 296 (contending that "[rlepatriation is an issue of civil rights for Native
Americans and, by extension, for all of us").
172. See 136 CONG. REC. at S17,174. Senator lnouye stated:
When human remains are displayed in museums or historical societies, it is never
the bones of white soldiers or the first European settlers that came to this continent
lying in glass cases. It is the Indian remains. The message that this sends to the
rest of the world is that Indians are culturally and physically different from and
inferior to non-Indians. This is racism.
Id.
173. Rep. Morris K. Udall (D.-Ariz.), who introduced NAGPRA to the House, wrote that
this legislation
does not simply address the return of native American remains to their rightful
resting place, or the matter of protection of Indian graves in the future. It goes far
beyond that. It addresses our civility, and our common decency .... In the larger
scope of history, this is a very small thing. In the smaller scope of conscience, it
may be the biggest thing we have ever done.
136 CONG. REC. E3484-01, E3484-01 (extension of daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
174. Senator Inouye, who introduced NAGPRA to the Senate, stated that "the bill represents
a major step in correcting an injustice that started over 100 years ago. It is appropriate that
Congress take an active role in helping to restore these rights to native Americans .... " 136
CONG. REC. at S17175.
175. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 47, 484 (1957). And Justice Brandies stated that the
First Amendment protects expression reflecting ideas "which a vast majority of. . .citizens
believe] to be false and fraught with evil consequencefs]." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
374 (1927) (concurring opinion in which Holmes, J., joined).
176. Walter Echo-Hawk, a Pawnee and attorney for the Native American Rights Fund,
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American ethos recognizes that failing to protect the rights of a minority is
not only a national embarrassment, but contrary to the values upon which this
nation was founded: that all people are created equal. In sum, NAGPRA is
not grounded solely upon the morality or value judgements of Congress, but
grounded upon principles of equality and dignity for all people, clearly both
of which are compelling governmental interests.
b) The Compelling Governmental Interest in According All People
Equal Quasi-properly Rights
There is a compelling governmental interest in allowing Native Americans,
and non-Native Americans, the power to decide how one's own or familial
remains are disposed of, including whether remains should be used in
scientific research.1" NAGPRA clearly reflects this interest. Our legal
system invests people with a quasi-property right in the remains of their
family members. Consequently, family members historically decide how to
dispose of a family member's remains, including whether to donate the organs
of a loved one, whether to cremate or bury the body, and who should retain
custody of a person's ashes."' Congress recognized that Native Americans
were not allowed the same right regarding the disposition of their ancestral
remains because legislation had deemed these remains federal property."
Thus, Congress intended to rectify this disparate treatment through NAGPRA
which requires that tribal members are granted quasi-property rights in their
culturally affiliated burial items and therefore should be allowed to make
decisions regarding who properly retains custody of these remains."
argues that the main issue underlying the repatriation movement is that Native American burial
sites must be accorded the same protection as all other burial sites. He claims that "Indians, as
members of the human race and the United States, should receive the same burial protection taken
for granted by every other racial and ethnic group. Thus, ending legal discrimination forms a
cornerstone of tribal opposition to unsolicited archaeological inquiry." Riding In, supra note 6,
at 23 (citations omitted).
177. Native Americans reject the notion that their remains are federal property and argue that
their ancestors "expected to receive etemal rest and never consented to become anyone else's
property." Riding In, supra note 6, at 26.
178. At common law, there is no property interest in a dead body. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D
Dead Bodies §§ 23-24 (1988); see also 25A CJ.S. Dead Bodies §§ 1-2 (1996). However, a
quasi-property interest is recognized for burial purposes, but it is unclear that ancient skeletal
remains fall within common law definition of a "dead body" so it "appears" that an institution
could not have a property right in skeletal remains. See id. Regardless, since 1906 the federal
government converted all ancient skeletal remains and grave goods into "federal property," and
thereby supported the notion that these items belonged in the custody of scientific institutions and
museums. Arguably, however, if any institution or person is granted a property or quasi-property
interest in Native American skeletal remains, it should be the ancestrally related tribe. See
discussion supra Part I.A.1.-4.
179. See discussion supra Part I.A.I.-2.; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433, 470(d)(d) (1994);
Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 577-79.
180. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994).
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c) Allowing One to Preserve His or Her Image After Death Is a
Compelling Governmental Interest
Just as there is a compelling governmental interest in granting people an
interest in controlling the disposition of their family members' remains,
Congress has a compelling interest in granting people the ability to determine
how their own remains will be disposed of after death. In 1997, Justice
Stevens, concurring in Washington v. Glucksberg, stated in dicta that an
individual has an interest, "even older than the common law," in controlling
one's image after death. 8' He stated that one's liberty interest in bodily
integrity "embraces ...her interest in dignity, and in determining the
character of the memories that will survive long after her death."412
Therefore, clearly the government's interest in preserving one's liberty interest
is compelling and reflected through NAGPRA where it requires that burial
sites cannot be excavated, or remains used for scientific research or display,
without the consent of tribally affiliated members.
NAGPRA not only mandates that the deceased will be treated with dignity,
but it assuages the fear of living Native Americans, and non-Native
Americans, that their remains might also be excavated some day in the name
of science."' As evidenced by inheritance, estate, and organ donation laws,
in addition to laws regarding the repatriation of American bodies from other
countries, people obtain psychological satisfaction from feeling as though they
have a measure of control over their possessions, and bodies, from beyond the
grave." Similarly, people receive psychological satisfaction from knowing
181. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2306-07 (1997) (Justice Stevens, J.,
concurring) (holding that there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide).
182. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2306. Justice Stevens further stated:
[q]either the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty
which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are
limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen.
The relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of
the citizen who must live in an ordered society ... But it is not the source of
liberty, and surely not the exclusive source. I had thought it self-evident that all
men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable
rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than
the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.
Id. at 2307 n.10 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
183. See Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 564, 578.
184. This fact was brought up in the legislative history of NAGPRA, where Rep. Ben
Nighthorse Campbell (R.-Colo.) stated:
[l]n the past several years the United States Government has does much to retrieve
the human remains of our brave service men and women who died during the
Vietnam war. Sparing little so that the remains of these fine people can be brought
home to the ones who loved them, buried with full military honors and by the
wishes of their families. We now have the opportunity to continue and extend this
stance to native Americans so that their ancestors can finally be put to rest.
136 CONG. REc. H10,985-01, H10,989 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1996).
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they will not unconsentingly end up as material for scientific research or an
"object of curiosity" displayed in a museum."s  NAGPRA reflects a
compelling governmental interest because it seeks to protect Native
Americans' liberty interests by requiring consent before their own remains, or
those of the ancestors, can be used as research material at all, particularly in
research disrespectful of or destructive to the remains."
2. NAGPRA Is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Compelling Governmental
Interests
NAGPRA is narrowly tailored to suit these compelling governmental interests
and thus will likely withstand a constitutional challenge even if courts determine
scientific inquiry is prima facie First Amendment protected."s The Supreme
Court has long held that First Amendment protected expression may be
restricted as long as these restrictions are narrowly tailored to meet legitimate
legislative purposes."s NAGPRA is narrowly tailored to serve compelling
governmental interests: first, because it does not utterly foreclose scientific
research utilizing skeletal remains but merely restricts how these remains are
obtained; and second, the legislative history of NAGPRA proves the scientific
community found it specific enough to adequately represent their interests and
the interests of repatriation supporters.
3. NAGPRA Regulates, Not Forecloses, Scientific Research
NAGPRA is narrowly tailored legislation which suits legitimate governmental
ends. For example, NAGPRA's reach does not include those items recovered
on state or privately held land, nor does it reach items held by bona fide
purchasers.' Only. items recovered on federal or tribal land and held by
185. See Stem & Slade, supra note 9, at 160.
186. For instance, many Native Americans consent to archaeological and anthropologic
studies utilizing remains after they are told what the research entails. These groups then repatriate
only after these studies are finished. However, most Native American tribes refuse to allow
ancestral remains to be used in research using analysis because of the necessary destruction to
the remains such analysis causes, thereby leaving little of the remains to be repatriated. See
Riding In, supra note 6, at 23; see also Thompson & Hill, supra note 54, at D07.
187. Again a constitutional argument against NAGPRA based on the right of scientific
inquiry must overcome the O'Brien test. O'Brien stands for the proposition that only regulations
intended to prohibit the ultimate dissemination of data or ideas gleaned from an experiment would
violate the First Amendment right to free expression; NAGPRA is not an example of such a
regulation and therefore only subject to the minimal protections of due process guarantees. See
Lisman, supra note 108, at 5.
188. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
189. Congress carefully constructed NAGPRA to avoid potential problems, such as
repatriation of remains from non-federally funded institutions thereby constituting a Fifth
Amendment violation. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,173-02, S17,176 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990)
(comments of Sen. McCain).
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federally funded institutions are legislatively subject to repatriation."2
Additionally, NAGPRA does not demand widescale repatriation of these
items,' but only requires that culturally affiliated tribes are made aware these
items are stored in institutions and are available for repatriation where
appropriate,' and that scientists seek tribal consent before conducting studies
on these remains. " Thus, NAGPRA is a constitutional restriction on the
alleged right of scientific inquiry because it is not intended to prohibit the use
of skeletal remains in research, or to prohibit the dissemination of data arising
out of this research,"94 but carefully and fairly restricts how this data is
obtaineA."'
4. NAGPRA Is Narrowly Structured Compromise Legislation
Congress also carefully constructed NAGPRA so that it would grant Native
Americans custody of ancestral remains where appropriate, while still allowing
scientists and others access to remains where no culturally affiliated tribe
requests repatriation. Whereas, as pointed out by two legal scholars, all
previous federal legislation dealing with the custody of Native American burial
items focused on the "protection of the irreplaceable scientific and cultural data
and knowledge embodied" therein, NAGPRA seeks to include and protect
190. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(4), 3002 (1994).
191. In fact, there have been many instances where tribes allow these institutions to retain
custody of these items and merely guide them on the appropriate manner in which they should
be stored. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002(e) (1994) (allowing Native Americans to relinquish control of
their cultural items rather than choosing repatriation).
192. For instance, a tribe must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they are
culturally affiliated with the remains and that the items were not legally purchased from the tribe.
See 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994) (establishing the standard of proof necessary to prove burial goods
are culturally affiliated with an existing tribe).
193. Foreclosing scientific access to remains could not be said to further any compelling
governmental interest because scientific inquiry has long been regarded both and an important
and necessary activity. However, as discussed supra Part III.B.I., scientific inquiry is an area
properly regulated by the government.
194. Congress acknowledged the scientific value inherent in these items covered by
NAGPRA, and thus did not intend to foreclose research using skeletal remains. For example,
Representative Campbell stated that
[t]his bill takes into account that many of these items may be of considerable
scientific value and allows for current studies to continue with repatriation
occurring after the completion of such a study. It further acknowledges that
repatriation is not the only alternative and I encourage all sides to try to work out
agreeable compromises where all interested parties can benefit from access to
some of the items.
136 CONG. REC. at H10989.
195. Senator Inouye stated: "As enlightened people, we welcome scientific inquiry and the
opportunity to know more about ourselves. Accordingly, we welcome the preservation and
scientific purposes that museums fulfill .... This legislation is designed to facilitate a more open
and cooperative relationship between native Americans and museums." 136 CONG. REc. at
S17,174.
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Native American interests.'99 Two years prior to NAGPRA's passage, the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs appointed "representatives of the museum
community, including archaeologists and anthropologists, [to meet] with tribal
representatives to discuss the repatriation of human remains" in order to
determine what legislation would appropriately reflect all these interests.'"
These meetings resulted in NAGPRA, which Senator McCain said "represents
a true compromise."'98 In the House, Representative Rhodes said NAGPRA
"reflect[s] a consensus among the constituency groups most affected by the
policy in the bill - museums, scientists, and Native Americans."'"9 In sum,
NAGPRA grants "native Americans greater ability to negotiate" when seeking
repatriation of federally stored remains.ze Thus, NAGPRA proves that "the
disposition and treatment of native American human remains and cultural items
can be achieved in a manner that reflects respect for the human rights of
native Americans, and for the values of science and public education."'"
196. See Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Crossroads: The
National Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21st
Century, 18 PuB. LAND & REsOURCES L. REv. 5, 13 (1997), available in Westlaw, 18 PUBLRLR
5. Additionally, this author notes that the reason Native American goods were historically deemed
federal property is because "none of the earlier Native American cultural preservation statutes
provided for Native American participation in the planning or administration of federal programs
or projects that have significant impact on protected Native American cultural resources." Id. at
14.
197. 136 CONG. REC. at S17,173 (comments of Sen. McCain).
198. Id. at S17,173, S17,177 (comments of Sen. McCain). Senator McCaln further stated that
"[m]any parties interested in this legislation did not receive everything they wanted .... In the
end, each party had to give a little in order to strike a true balance and to resolve these very
difficult and emotional issues." Id. Representative Campbell stated that
[t]his bill comes after many, many, long hours of negotiations among interested
parties. Among the participants in these negotiations were representatives of the
museum community, the scientific community and the Indian community. They
met on several occasions to reach agreement and what is currently before the
house conforms to those agreements.
136 CONG. REc. at H10,988.
199. Id. at H10,989 (comments of Rep. Rhodes).
200. 136 CONG. REC. at S17,175 (comments of Sen. Inouye). Senator Inouye further stated
that
[elven today, when supposedly great strides have been made to recognize the
rights of Indians to recover the skeletal remains of their ancestors and to repossess
items of sacred value and cultural patrimony, the wishes of native Americans have
often been ignored by the scientific community. In cases where native Americans
have attempted to regain items that were inappropriately alienated from the tribe,
they have often met with resistance from museums and have not had the legal
ability or financial resources to pursue the return of the good. It is virtually only
in instances where a museum has agreed for moral or political reasons to return
the goods that tribes have had success in retrieving property.
Id. at S17,174. Thus, Congress passed NAGPRA as a means to level the playing field between
tribes, museums and scientific institutions.
201. 136 CONG. REC. at H10,989 (comments of Rep. Rhodes).
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IV. Conclusion
Science has been under fire in recent years in part because of the alarming
rate at which it is progressing. For example, many feel as though humanity
is unprepared for scientific and technological breakthroughs such as human
cloning, genetic manipulation, and "nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
warfare.." Although scientific research and experimentation can benefit
humanity, science must respect fundamental human rights and cannot progress
without restrictions aimed at ensuring these rights. The fields of archaeology
and anthropology have demonstrated that ancient skeletal remains and burial
goods inherently contain information which adds to the body of knowledge
regarding not only the evolution of Native Americans, but the rest of
humanity. In certain instances, however, this research has had discriminatory
motives, and thus can no longer be absolutely and unquestionably permitted.
Regardless of whether courts determine that the First Amendment
implicitly protects a right of scientific inquiry, NAGPRA can withstand a
constitutional challenge because it permissibly restricts the right of scientific
inquiry. NAGPRA furthers at least three compelling governmental interests:
first, it ends the discriminatory protection of Native American grave sites;
second, it grants Native Americans quasi-property rights equal to those
granted to non-Native Americans; and third, it allows Native Americans to
exercise control of their image after death. Additionally, NAGPRA is
narrowly structured so that it does not utterly foreclose the use of Native
American skeletal remains and also reflects a compromise between the
scientific community and repatriation supporters. NAGPRA clearly has not
ended the debate between the scientific community who seeks access to
Native American remains and repatriation supporters who believe that the
excavation of remains has serious psychological, and potentially physical,
consequences. However, under NAGPRA both sides of the issue are playing
on a level field and are forced to listen, rather than merely hear, each other.
202. See Smith, supra note 5, at 167.
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